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ABSTRACT
APPROXIMATE DISASSEMBLY
by Dhivyakrishnan Radhakrishnan
     For the past two decades, computer viruses have been a constant security threat. A 
computer virus is a type of malware that may damage computer systems by destroying 
data, crashing the system, or through other malicious activity. Among the different types 
of viruses, metamorphic viruses are one of the most difficult to detect since such viruses 
change their internal structures with each mutation, making signature-based detection 
infeasible. Many construction kits are available that can be used to easily generate 
metamorphic strains of any given virus. 
     Previous work has shown that metamorphic viruses are detectable using Hidden 
Markov Models (HMM). In such an HMM-based approach, instruction opcodes are 
observed and a model is trained to detect a given virus family. These instruction opcodes 
are obtained by disassembling the binary executable file. However, the disassembling 
process is time-consuming, making the process impractical. In this project, we develop 
and demonstrate a technique to derive an approximate opcode sequence directly from the 
executable file, which, in general, reduces the time required as compared to a standard 
disassembly process. 
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11. Introduction
     A computer virus is a software program that infects a computer system without the 
user’s knowledge. The virus replicates itself into a computer system and affects the root 
functions of various programs. Computer viruses can cause many types of damage such 
as deletion of files, reformatting of hard drive, system slow down, or connectivity issues. 
Viruses usually spread through storage devices, computer networks or the Internet.
     Over the past two decades, viruses have evolved rapidly. They have caused crucial 
financial damage to businesses and organizations. For example, in 2000, the virus “Love
Letter” affected 10 million computers causing damages on the order of $10 billion [2].
     With the advent and growth of viruses, a variety of anti-virus tools have evolved to 
detect and manage the threats. These tools use a wide range of techniques to identify and 
remove viruses. However, there is no single antivirus software that protects a computer 
system from all viruses [1]. 
     Viruses continue to evolve in an effort to stay ahead of advances in anti-virus 
software. One of the most advanced classes of viruses are the metamorphic viruses which
change their structure with every mutation. They are harder to detect since the mutations
are not close to their parents [7]. However, such viruses can be detected using a Hidden 
Markov Model (HMM) [9].
     Most of the virus detection techniques use a disassembler to analyze the assembly 
code of the virus [7]. Our research focuses on improving the speed of the standard 
disassembler. This report is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief description of 
various types of viruses. Section 3 gives an overview of HMMs. Section 4 gives a 
2detailed explanation of the disassembly process. Section 5 explains our new method that
reduces the disassembly time as compared to a standard disassembly process. Section 6 
covers our results.
     
     
32. Types of viruses
    There are several classes of viruses and each one of them affects the computer system 
in a different way. The following are some of the most popular computer viruses[7]:
 Macro virus
 Boot sector virus
 File infector virus
 Encrypted virus
 Polymorphic virus
 Metamorphic virus
2. 1 Macro viruses
     Macro virus is a virus that is embedded as part of a document or any other application 
such as Microsoft Office. These viruses may inflict harm to other documents available on 
the system when opened. Macro viruses usually spread through mail attachments or file 
transfers, and now they also occur in web pages. Recent versions of the Windows
operating system include antivirus tools that disable macro viruses by default [4]. A 
common example of a macro virus is the Melissa virus of 1999 [5].     
2.2 Boot sector viruses
     A Boot sector virus is a virus that causes damage to the boot sector of a hard drive, 
CD/DVD or floppy disks. Once the computer boots, the boot sector virus remains in the 
memory and infects floppy and other bootable media when they are being accessed. Boot 
4sector viruses have become relatively uncommon due to the rare use of floppy disks in 
recent times [4]. A fine example of a boot sector virus is the Michelangelo virus of 1991
[5].
2.3 File infector viruses 
     A file infector virus is a virus that infects files in a computer system. When an infected 
file is executed, the virus replicates itself to other applications in the system. File infector
viruses are usually common among .exe and.com files. File infector viruses cause system 
hang-ups and slow performance [4]. An example of a file infector virus is the Cleevix 
virus of 2006 [5]. 
2.4 Encrypted viruses
     An encrypted virus is a type of virus where the virus code is encrypted to avoid 
signature detection. The encrypted virus code changes with each infection by using a 
different encryption key but uses the same decryption key.  Hence, it is still possible to 
detect encrypted viruses based on the decryption key [6].
2.5 Polymorphic viruses
     Polymorphic viruses are an extension of encrypted viruses where the decryption key is 
different with each infection. But the decrypted virus code is the same regardless of the 
different decryption key. Antivirus programs that incorporate code emulation techniques 
can detect polymorphic viruses [6].
52.6 Metamorphic viruses
     Metamorphic viruses are more powerful than polymorphic viruses. Unlike 
polymorphic viruses, they do not decrypt to the same virus code. Metamorphic viruses
change the structure of their code without affecting the functionality. The changed code is 
recompiled to create a virus executable that looks different from the original [6]. Such 
modification is achieved by using several metamorphic techniques that are explained in 
Section 2.6.1. Figure 1 shows multiple shapes of a metamorphic virus body.
6Figure 1: Multiple shapes of a metamorphic virus body [7]
   
72.6.1 Different kinds of metamorphism
     Metamorphic viruses use different kinds of techniques to make the new infection look 
different from the existing one. The following are some of the commonly used 
metamorphic techniques explained by Szor in [7]:
 Garbage Insertion
 Register Usage Exchange
 Instruction Replacement
 Subroutine reordering
2.6.1.1 Garbage Insertion 
     This is a simple morphing technique that is widely used by metamorphic viruses. It 
inserts garbage or jump instructions into the code, which occupy space but do not affect 
the functionality of the code. These viruses are harder to analyze because unwanted or 
garbage instructions exist in larger quantities. These instructions might even introduce 
new errors in the program. Win32/Evol is a virus that inserts garbage instructions
between core instructions [7].
2.6.1.2 Register Usage Exchange
     Register usage exchange is another simple technique that uses different registers for 
new infections but continues to use the same virus code. However, such viruses can be
8detected by using wild card strings. W95/Regswap is a virus that uses the register usage 
exchange technique [7].    
2.6.1.3 Instruction Replacement
     Instruction replacement technique replaces a set of instructions in a virus with an 
equivalent set. Instruction replacement also has no impact on the functionality of the 
code. Win95/Bistro is a virus that uses the instruction replacement technique [7].
2.6.1.4 Subroutine Reordering
     In this technique, the subroutines are reordered and branch instructions are used to 
connect them to maintain the functionality. The order of subroutines is different for each 
infection. If there are n subroutines in a given virus, then this technique creates n! 
variants of that virus. Win32/Ghost is a virus that uses the subroutine reordering 
technique [7].
93. HMM and metamorphic virus detection 
     An HMM is a state machine with hidden states where the transitions between states 
have a fixed probability. The external observer can only see a set of observations which 
depend (probabilistically) on the hidden states. Once a HMM has been trained with a set 
of observation sequences, the model has the ability to detect similar sequences in a given 
input. HMM are well suited for statistical pattern analysis [9].
     Consider the following notations of HMM used in [8]:
T = the length of the observation sequence
N = the number of states in the model
M = the number of observation symbols
Q = {q0, q1, . . . , qN-1} = the states of the Markov process
V = {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1} = set of possible observations
A = the state transition probabilities
B = the observation probability matrix
π = the initial state distribution
O = (O0,O1, . . . ,OT-1) = observation sequence.
Xi  = Hidden state
     Figure 2 illustrates a generic HMM with the notation given above. 
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Figure 2: Hidden Markov Model [8]
         
     The matrix A = {aij} is of size N × N with
a ij = P(state qj at t + 1 | state qi at t)
     and A is row stochastic. Note that the probabilities aij are independent of t. 
     The matrix B = {bj(k)} is of size N ×M with
bj(k) = P(observation k at t | state qj at t).
     Thus, an HMM is denoted by (π, A, B), where the matrices π, A and B are row 
stochastic.
     Metamorphic viruses have similarities in their code structure, in spite of their ability to 
mutate with each infection. These similarities help HMM to detect metamorphic viruses. 
In the HMM, the virus characteristics are the states and the instruction opcode sequence 
is the observation set. Stamp et al in [9] used HMM to detect metamorphic viruses.
     The procedure involved in training the HMM is as follows:
1. Collect a set of executable files that belong to the same family
2. Disassemble the collected executable files into assembly code
11
3. Extract opcode sequence from the assembly code
4. Train the model with the extracted opcode sequence
Figure 3 illustrates the process involved in creating a HMM.
Figure 3: Creating a HMM model (Preprocessing of virus file) [9]
     A set of viruses of the same family are assembled into the corresponding set of 
executable files using an assembler (e.g. TASM, TLINK). Each executable file is then 
disassembled using a disassembler (e.g. IDA Pro). An opcode sequence is extracted from 
the disassembled files to create a HMM.          
     After the creation of HMM, the HMM is tested using a set of files. Some of the files in 
the set belong to the family of viruses for which the HMM is created and trained for. The 
HMM processes these files and should give a high score to the virus files of the same 
family and low score to the others [9]. 
      The next section describes about the disassembly process that plays a crucial role in 
detecting metamorphic viruses using HMM.
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4. Disassembly
     Computer programs are human readable programs written in a high-level language 
like C, C++, etc. These programs are translated into a CPU readable, executable file. The 
CPU uses these executable files to execute the instructions to perform the required 
operation. Figure 4 shows how human readable computer programs are converted into 
CPU readable machine code.
     
          Figure 4: Levels of Data Representation [10]           
     Disassembly is the process of converting machine language back into assembly 
language. Figure 5 illustrates the disassembly process. 
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                   Figure 5: Disassembly Process [10]   
     Section 4.1 describes details of the assembly language instruction set, by using Intel 
instruction set as an example. Section 4.2 describes details of the disassembler.    
4.1 Intel Instruction Set
     Instruction set architecture is a part of computer architecture that acts as an interface 
between hardware and software. It contains a list of instructions that the processor can 
understand and execute. The basic types of instructions are as follows:
 arithmetic (add, subtract) 
 logic (and, or)
 data (mov, load)
 control flow (call, return)
     Figure 6 shows the layout of the computer architecture in which the instruction set 
architecture lies between software and hardware. 
14
     
         Figure 6: Layout of Computer Architecture [10]
      Intel x86 processors use complex instruction set computer (CISC) architecture that 
comprise large number of variable-length instructions and complex addressing modes.  In 
the Intel instruction set, there are more than 100 instructions and each instruction can be 1 
to 17 bytes long [11].
4.1.1 Instruction Format
     Instructions in the Intel instruction set start with an optional instruction prefix. The 
instruction prefix is followed by an opcode field, which can be 1 or 2 bytes.  The 
instruction also includes an addressing-form specifier (if required) consisting of the 
ModR/M byte and sometimes the SIB (Scale-Index-Base) byte, a displacement (if 
required), and an immediate data field (if required) [11]. Details of the individual fields in 
Computer Architecture
Hardware
                                              
                                              
Software 
         Inte rface between Hardware and Software
             (Instruction Set Architecture)
Application Program
Operating System
Compiler
CPU Memory I/O 
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the instruction are explained in the following subsections. Figure 7 illustrates the format 
of the instruction. 
Figure 7:  Intel Instruction Format [11]
4.1.1.1 Instruction Prefix
    Instruction prefix is divided into four groups. Each group has a set of allowable prefix 
codes.  Each prefix is of one-byte length. An instruction can have 1 prefix from each 
group with a maximum of 4 prefix bytes. The Intel manual specifies the following four 
groups of instruction prefixes [11]:
1. Segment override prefix (2EH,36H,3EH,26H,64H,65H) changes the default 
segment of the instruction
2. Operand-size override prefix (66H) overrides the default operand-size of the 
instruction. The default size is either 16-bit or 32-bit operand.
3. Address-size override prefix (67H) overrides the default address-size of the 
instruction. The default size is either 16-bit or 32-bit address.
4. Repeat (F2H,F3H) and Lock prefix(F0H) controls the loop in the string 
instructions and bus usage of the processors.
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4.1.1.2 Opcodes
     The primary opcode of the instruction is either 1 or 2 bytes. The opcode field defines a 
small encoding field, and the encoding field size varies depending on the operation. 
These encoded fields can determine displacement size, operational direction, conditional 
code, register encoding or sign extension of the immediate data field in the instruction. 
Sometimes an additional three-bit field from the ModR/M byte can also be used as part of 
the opcode [11].
4.1.1.3 ModR/M bytes
     The ModR/M byte is the first byte of the addressing-form specifier. This field gives 
information about which registers or memory locations are to be used by the instruction.
The ModR/M byte consists of three fields [11]:
 Mod: The mod field together with the r/m field defines one of the eight registers 
or one of the twenty-four addressing modes. It is a two-bit length field.
 Register/Opcode: The three-bit length register/opcode field specifies a register or 
three additional bits of opcode information.
 R/M: The r/m field is a three-bit length field that can either specify a register as an 
operand or can be used in conjunction with the mod field to encode an addressing 
mode.
4.1.1.4 SIB bytes
          The SIB byte, the second byte of the addressing-form specifier is used to determine 
the address of the operand's memory based on the following three fields [11]:
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 Scale: It is a two-bit length field that specifies the scale factor.
 Index: It is a three-bit length field that specifies the register number of the index 
register. It is used for index addressing.
 Base: It is a three-bit length field that specifies the register number of the base 
register. It is used for base addressing. 
     Figure 8 shows the calculation of operand's address based on scale, index and base 
value.
Figure 8:  Offset (or Effective Address Computation) in [12]
4.1.1.5 Displacement and Immediate bytes
     The displacement field is used when some instructions specify a displacement value 
that is added to the operands memory address. For example, in the instruction MOV 
EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[BX+SI+3124], 3124 is the displacement value added to the 
memory address. The displacement (if required) can be 1, 2, or 4 bytes long. An
18
immediate field is used when the instructions specify an immediate operand. In the 
instruction, CMP BX, 20, the immediate operand is 20. The immediate operand can also 
be 1, 2, or 4 bytes long [11].
4.2 Disassembler algorithm
   Figure 9 shows the control flow of the disassembler algorithm.
Figure 9: Disassembler Algorithm
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     The disassembler algorithm takes a PE file as an input and identifies the compiler that 
built the PE file. The disassembler can achieve a high degree of accuracy in identifying 
variables, objects and procedures of the target file by knowing the compiler type. The 
disassembler reads each input byte and determines if it is a prefix byte. If the byte read is 
a prefix byte, then the next byte is an opcode byte. Then, the operand size of the 
instruction is determined based on the MOD R/M, SIB, displacement or immediate fields 
in the following bytes. The disassembler skips the operands and jumps to the next 
instruction. The disassembler continues the process until it reaches the end of the file. 
4.3 Disassembly techniques
     There are two main techniques for disassembling the machine code:
1. Linear Sweeping
2. Recursive Traversal
Each of the above technique is explained in detail in the following subsections.
4.3.1 Linear Sweeping
    Linear sweeping algorithm extracts the text section from the executable file. The 
instructions in the text section are sequentially processed until the end of file. Although 
this algorithm is quite simple and fast, it cannot detect data encoded in the instruction 
itself [13].
     In Figure 10, the sample disassembly file has a bunch of non-executable instructions 
(0040289D to 004028B5) between executable instructions which cannot be caught by the 
20
linear sweeping algorithm because it considers each and every instruction as executable 
bytes. 
Figure 10: Disassembled File
Consider the non-executable instruction at 004028A5 in Figure 10:
004028A5        9cC144000          DD DAMsetup.004019c
The linear sweep algorithm disassembles the above non-executable instructions as 
executable instructions:
004028A5        9C             PUSHF
004028A6        1440 00     ADC AL , 00
21
A single disassembly error as shown above can significantly affect the disassembled 
output. Thus the linear sweeping algorithm does not always produce the correct source 
code. SoftICE and WinDbg are disassemblers that use the linear sweeping algorithm [13].
4.3.2 Recursive Traversal
     Like the linear sweeping algorithm, recursive traversal algorithm starts processing the 
instructions from the beginning of the text section. The main difference is that the 
recursive traversal algorithm does not process the instructions sequentially. The 
algorithm depends on the control flow of the program. If the instruction processed is a
jump instruction, then the algorithm jumps to the jump address specified and starts
processing the bytes at the jump address instead of the consecutive bytes. This approach 
can detect data encoded in the instructions. But the recursive traversal algorithm cannot 
construct the correct code sequence in case of indirect branch instructions. So this 
algorithm also does not always produce the correct source code. IDA Pro and OllyDbg 
are disassemblers that use the recursive traversal algorithm [13].
4.4 Challenges in Disassembly
     The following elements in the instruction stream may pose significant challenges in 
the disassembly process:
 Variable length instructions 
 Embedded data in text sections(jump tables, alignment bytes)
 Branch instructions and indirect jumps
 Functions with no explicit call
22
     Variable length instructions can cause a disassembler program to yield more than one 
reasonable disassembled output. Data embedded in text sections cannot be detected by 
disassembler algorithms like the linear sweep algorithm. Branch instructions, indirect 
jumps and functions with no explicit call may cause incorrect disassembled code when 
disassembled using the recursive traversal algorithm. 
     In addition to the above issues, memory requirements associated with the disassembly
process can also be quite significant. According to PE Explorer, “Disassembling files 
larger than 1 Mb in size can take several minutes depending on the capabilities of your 
system. Generally, each byte of a target file requires 40 bytes of memory for processing. 
For example, a 1 Mb file would require 40 Mb of processing memory, a 2 Mb file — 80 
Mb and so on” [14].
23
5. Extraction of opcode sequence 
    In this section, we describe our method of extracting opcode sequences from a 
executable. Stamp et. al in [9] used IDA Pro to disassemble executable files. From the 
IDA Pro disassembled files, the opcodes are extracted and concatenated to form an 
opcode sequence. The extracted opcode sequence is then used as an observation set for 
HMM to detect metamorphic viruses. But the disassembly process consumes a lot of time 
and becomes impractical for large files. We implemented an alternative method that
efficiently parses the executable file and extracts an approximate opcode sequence from 
the file. The steps involved in extracting the approximate opcode sequence are as follows:
1. Extract the text section from executable file.
2. Extract the opcodes from the text section.
3. Concatenate the opcodes to form an approximate opcode sequence.
Each of above steps is explained in the following subsections.
5.1 Extraction of text section
     This section describes the structure of the Portable Executable (PE) format and the 
method used to extract the text from the PE file. 
5.1.1 PE File Format
          PE file format is the file format used in Microsoft Windows Operating Systems. 
We chose the PE executable format as our format, as it is the most commonly used file 
format and is the most vulnerable to virus attacks. PE file format is derived from the 
Common Object File Format (COFF), which is the file format of Unix System[15]. The 
24
general layout of a PE file is shown in Figure 11
Figure 11: PE file format in [15]
The PE file consists of the following fields [15]:
 MS DOS header
 PE header
 Optional header
 Section header
25
 Sections
Each field of the PE file is explained in detail in the following subsections.
5.1.1.1 MS DOS header
     An MS-DOS executable header is found at the start of the PE file. This header 
indicates that the PE file is a valid MS-DOS executable file. PE files with the MS-DOS 
header cannot be run on machines running different operating systems. The DOS header 
can be identified by a sixteen-bit signature. It is represented as “0x5A4D” in hex or “MZ”
in ASCII [15].
5.1.1.2 PE header
     The next field in the PE file format is the PE header. The PE header contains a thirty-
two- bit signature, which is “0x00004550” in hex or “PE\0\0” in ASCII. This signature 
indicates that the executable is a PE file. The PE header consists of a file signature, COFF 
header, and an optional header. Table 1 contains the description of the COFF header
fields [15].
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TABLE 1: COFF HEADER [15]
Offset Size Field Description
  0 2 Machine The number that identifies the type of target 
machine. 
Offset Size Field Description
  2 2 NumberOfSections The number of sections. This indicates the size 
of the section table, which immediately follows 
the headers.
  4 4 TimeDateStamp The low 32 bits of the number of seconds since 
00:00 January 1, 1970 (a C run-time time_t 
value), that indicates when the file was created.
  8 4 PointerToSymbolTable The file offset of the COFF symbol table, or 
zero if no COFF symbol table is present. This 
value should be zero for an image because 
COFF debugging information is deprecated.
27
12 4 NumberOfSymbols The number of entries in the symbol table. This 
data can be used to locate the string table, which 
immediately follows the symbol table. This 
value should be zero for an image because 
COFF debugging information is deprecated.
16 2 SizeOfOptionalHeader The size of the optional header, which is 
required for executable files but not for object 
files. This value should be zero for an object 
file. 
18 2 Characteristics The flags that indicate the attributes of the file.
     The NumberofSections and the OptionalSizeheader fields are the only fields used in 
the extraction of the text section. 
5.1.1.3 Optional header 
     As the name indicates, this header is optional for executable files. This header 
provides information to the operating system’s loader. For example, this header is 
required for image files. Since the text section appears after the optional header, the 
optional header field is skipped in the extraction process [15].
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5.1.1.4 Section header
     The section header follows the optional header. It defines the structure of each section. 
The section header is 40 bytes long, and the following fields are needed for the text 
section extraction [15]:
 Name: This field determines the name of the section. It is used to identify the                        
text section.
 Characteristics: This field describes the characteristics of the section. It is also 
used to identify the text section.
 SizeOfRawData:  This field determines the size of the text section. It is used to 
extract the text section.       
 PointerToRawData : This field points to the start of the text section.  It is used to 
locate the code.    
5.1.1.5 Sections
     The sections are divided into the following five categories [15]:
 .text: This section contains executable instructions. These instructions cannot be 
altered, so it is a read-only section.
 .data: This section contains the global variables initialized by the programmer. 
These variables can be changed at runtime, so it is a read-write section.
 rdata: This section holds the debug data that is only present in executable files.
 .bss: This section contains uninitialized variables or common storage.
 idata: This section lists the symbols imported into a file.
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     Figure 12 shows the detailed layout of PE file including the different sections.
Figure 12: Detailed layout of PE Executable [15]
5.1.2 Extraction of text section
     This section explains how the text section is extracted from a PE executable file. 
Govindaraj [16] explains the steps to extract the text section from an executable file as 
shown in Figure 13. The program first searches for the DOS header by looking for the 
signature “0x5A4D” or “MZ.” Then the program looks for the PE signature 
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“0x00004550” or “PE”. The program obtains the size of the optional header from the 
SizeOfOptionalHeader field and uses that to skip the optional header.
     The program specifically looks for the text section. Each section can be identified by 
the name field or by the characteristics field. For the text section, the name field contains 
“.text” or “.code” name, and the characteristics field contains “0x0000020.” Since the 
name for the text section is not standardized, the program checks both the name and 
characteristic fields to identify the text section. The start of the text section is located 
using the PointerToRawData field. The text section is extracted using the 
SizeOfRawData field [16]. 
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Figure 13: PE Text Section flow [16]
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5.2 Approximate opcode sequence
The Intel instruction set contains more than 100 instructions.  Disassembly 
process gets very complicated and time consuming if all the instructions are taken into 
account. As the executable file size increases, the complexity increases manifold when all 
the instructions are accounted for. In order to reduce the complexity, we only consider the 
Most Frequently Occurred (MFO) instructions in our method.
     According to Billar, there are only 14 instructions in the Intel instruction set that are 
commonly used by PE files and these instructions are called MFO instructions. The MFO 
instruction set consists of ADD, AND, CALL, CMP, JMP, JNZ, JZ, LEA, MOV, PUSH, 
POP, RETN, TEST and XOR [17]. Figure 14 shows frequency of occurrence of MFO 
opcode mnemonics in normal files
Figure 14: Frequency of occurrence of MFO opcodes in normal files (in percentage)
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    As discussed in Section 4.1, instruction opcodes are either 1 or 2 bytes long. The 
maximum length of a given instruction is 17 bytes. So the operand size for a given
instruction can vary from 0 to 16 bytes. We divide the MFO instruction opcodes into
three sets of opcode tables based on operands as follows:
 a table that has a list of opcodes with no operand 
 a table that has a list of opcodes with one operand 
 a table that has a list of opcodes with more than one operand
In addition to the three sets of MFO opcode tables, we also collect statistical data for 
the occurrence of opcode pairs as shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2: SAMPLE STATISTICAL DATA OF OPCODE PAIRS
Opcode Pair
(opi , opi+1)
Length of bytes, n Probability value 
ff, ff 2 0.025
8b, 8b 4 0.014
50, ff 0 0.010
8d, 50 2 0.010
e8, 8b 4 0.009
ff, 8b 1 0.009 
8b,  83 2 0.009
ff, e8 5 0.008
85, 74 2 0.008
8d, e8 5 0.008
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     A large set of normal files is disassembled using IDA Pro. Then the frequency of 
occurrence of opcode pairs is collected from the disassembled files in addition to the 
number of bytes between them. The probability of opi followed by opi+1 when there are n 
bytes between them is calculated and stored as the statistical triplet (opi, opi+1, n). Using 
this statistical data, an approximate opcode sequence is extracted with our algorithm as 
shown. Figure 15 shows frequency of occurrence of MFO pairs in normal files
      
Figure 15: Frequency of occurrence of MFO pairs in normal files (in percentage)
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     Figure 16 shows the program flow of our method. In our method, the program takes a 
PE file as an input. Since the text section has he executable instructions, the program 
extracts that section from the PE file. We start processing the input one byte at a time. If 
the byte read is “0F”, then this can be a 2 byte opcode, so the next byte is read and 
appended to this byte. Else, the read byte is assumed to be a 1 byte opcode. The opcode 
that is read is then checked against each of the three tables. If the opcode occurs in the 
table with no operands, then the next byte is assumed to be the next opcode. If the opcode 
occurs in the table with one operand, the next byte is skipped and the following byte is 
assumed to be the next opcode. 
     If the opcode occurs in the table with more than one operand, then a solution tree is 
constructed with all possible operand sizes. The operand size varies from 0 to 16 bytes in 
the Intel instruction set. There are very few opcodes which use 16 byte operands, so we 
optimize the problem by restricting it to a maximum of 8 byte operands. So the next 
opcode can be anywhere from 1 to 9 bytes away from the current byte. For each of the 
possible opcode pairs, the probability of occurrence of these pairs and the distance 
between them is annotated by adding the logarithmic value of the probability from the 
statistical table into the solution tree. We use the logarithmic value of the probabilities to 
avoid a numerical underflow in calculations associated with multiplication of small 
numbers. If the opcode pair does not occur in the statistics then it is assigned a low 
probability value (-100.0). If the opcode does not occur in any of the tables, the read byte 
is skipped. This process is repeated for every byte until the end of the file and a full 
sequence list with multiple branches are constructed. As we continue processing bytes in 
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the input stream, we optimize the solution tree by removing branches with low 
probability values. At the end of the file, an approximate opcode sequence is obtained by 
choosing the branch with the highest probability.     
Figure 16: Method for extracting approximate opcode sequence
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For example, consider the following sequence of input stream
Input stream:  568b7424088a46103c017439 3c02751c8be83f00….
Let’s divide the input stream byte by byte as shown below
Input byte stream:  56 8b 74 24 08 8a 46 10 3c 01 20 39 3c 02 75 1c e8 3f 00….
   Let’s take the first input byte 56. Since the first input byte is an opcode with no 
operand, we know the next input byte 8b is an opcode that follows 56. The opcode 
sequence becomes 568b. The second input byte is 8b. The opcode 8b is in the list of 
opcodes with more than one operand. So we form a solution tree of next possible opcodes
based on 8 possible operands. Table 3 shows the next possible opcode depending on the 
operands of the opcode 8b. Note the opcode pair (8b, 20) is assigned the value of -100.0
as it does not appear in the statistical data. This process continues till the end of the input 
file. 
TABLE 3: SOLUTION TREE CALCULATION
Opcode Possible Operand # of 
Operands
Next 
opcode
Opcode 
sequence
Statistics 
Value
8b 74 1 24 8b 24 -10.761
8b 74 24 2 08 8b 08 -100.0
8b 74 24 08 3 8a 8b 8a -9.505
8b 74 24 08 8a 4 46 8b 46 -10.499
8b 74 24 08 8a 46 5 10 8b 10 -100.0
8b 74 24 08 8a 46 10 6 3c 8b 3c -10.291
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8b 74 24 08 8a 46 10 3c 7 01 8b 01 -12.136
8b 74 24 08 8a 46 10 3c 01 8 20 8b 20 -100.0
Figure 17 shows a section of the solution tree for the above example.
     
Figure 17: Example of solution tree in extracting opcode sequence
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6. Implementation Results
     An input set of 200 normal files are taken and 150 out of the 200 files are used to 
collect the statistical data of opcode pair occurrences. This statistical data is collected 
using the IDA Pro disassembler. Using the statistical data, an approximate opcode 
sequence is extracted from the remaining 50 files .Then the extracted opcode sequence of 
each file is compared with IDA Pro. An average of 70.2% accuracy is achieved in 
extracting the opcode sequence when compared with IDA Pro. 
    The test sets below measures the time vs. file size comparison between our algorithm 
and the IDA Pro disassembler. The time taken by both the algorithms for each file is 
measured. The test set measures a set of files that range from 1MB to 5MB. 
Test set 1: Average File Size = 1MB
     In this test set, the file size ranges from 0.5MB to 1.5MB. An average time of 4.4
seconds is taken by our algorithm whereas 5.3 seconds time is taken by the IDA Pro 
disassembler. For this set, our algorithm is about 20% faster than IDA Pro. For some files 
in the data set, IDA Pro is faster than our algorithm, but the majority of the files take a 
shorter time with our algorithm than IDA Pro.
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Figure 18: Comparison of time taken between our approach and IDA Pro, File set 
1MB
Test set 2: Average File Size = 2MB
     In this test set, the file size ranges from 1.5MB to 2.5MB. An average time of 5.7
seconds is taken by our algorithm whereas 7.3 seconds time is taken by the IDA Pro 
disassembler. For this set, our algorithm is about 28% faster than IDA Pro. 
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Figure 19: Comparison of time taken between our approach and IDA Pro, File set 
2MB
Test set 3: Average File Size = 3MB
     In this test set, the file size ranges from 2.5MB to 3.5MB. An average time of 10.87 
seconds is taken by our algorithm whereas 13.4 seconds time is taken by the IDA Pro 
disassembler. For this set, my algorithm is about 34% faster than IDA Pro. 
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Figure 20: Comparison of time taken between our approach and IDA Pro, File set 
3MB
Test set 4: Average File Size = 4MB
     In this test set, the file size ranges from 3.5MB to 4.5MB. An average time of 12.9 
seconds is taken by our algorithm whereas 16.7 seconds time is taken by the IDA Pro 
disassembler. For this set, our algorithm is about 38% faster than IDA Pro.
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Figure 21: Comparison of time taken between our approach and IDA Pro, File set 
4MB
Test set 5: Average File Size = 5MB
     In this test set, the file size ranges from 4.5MB to 5.5MB. An average time of 19.25
seconds is taken by our algorithm whereas 23.6 seconds time is taken by the IDA Pro 
disassembler. For this set, our algorithm is about 44% faster than IDA Pro.
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Figure 22: Comparison of time taken between our approach and IDA Pro, File set 
5MB
Test set 6
     Figure 23 shows the average time taken for a given file size by our algorithm and IDA 
Pro. 
Figure 23: Average time comparison between our approach and IDA Pro
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     The graph shows that for small files, our algorithm is slightly better than IDA Pro. As 
the file size increases, IDA Pro’s disassembly time increases linearly. Our algorithm’s 
disassembly time also increase linearly. As the file size increases, the time difference 
between our algorithm and IDA Pro increases. 
Accuracy of opcode sequence
     The test set 7 below measures the accuracy of our algorithm as compared to IDA Pro 
for different file sizes. For a given file, we extract the output from IDA Pro and our 
algorithm. For every opcode pair in our output, we calculate the frequency of occurrence 
of the pair. We do the same for all the pairs in IDA Pro’s output and then calculate the 
difference in frequencies between our output and IDA Pro’s output. This difference is the 
number of misses that our algorithm has had with respect to IDA Pro. The total number 
of misses in the output divided by the total frequency in IDA Pro output gives us the 
accuracy of our algorithm for that file. We repeat this exercise for all the files in our test 
sets. Table 4 shows the error calculation for an example file of size 47KB.
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TABLE 4: ERROR CALCULATION OF AN EXAMPLE FILE
Opcode
Pair, Opi
IDA Pro Output
Pi for file(f)
Our method Ri
output for file(f)
Miss Calculation,
(Mi = Pi - Ri )
ff, ff 213 259 46
50, ff 72 78 6
8b, 8b 71 60 11
56, e8 63 57 6
68, ff 54 48 6
ff, 85 54 54 0
ff, 8b 53 69 16
57, e8 51 51 0
57, ff 50 54 4
6a, e8 49 73 24
85, 74 48 46 2
ff, e8 46 53 7
8b, 83 45 38 7
6a, ff 44 42 2
8d, 50 42 43 1
85, 75 38 37 1
ff, 6a 37 34 3
53, ff 34 37 3
ff, 83 34 31 3
50, e8 33 38 5
e8, 85 33 32 1
e8, 8b 33 39 6
39, 74 32 33 1
3b, 74 32 35 3
5f, 5e 32 30 2
83, 75 31 28 3
Total T(Pi)  =   1324 T(Ri)   = 1399 T(Mi) =  169
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From Table 4, the error percentage for the file (f) is calculated as:
Miss percentage, MP =   T (Mi)  
                                       ------------- X 100 where i= 0, 1, 2…N and N is the length
   T (Pi)  of opcode pair in a given file (f).
Accuracy percentage, AP = (100 - MP) %
For the sample file (f) in table 4, the miss percentage is calculated as 12%
((169/1324)*100). Thus the accuracy of opcode sequence for the file (f) with respect to 
IDA Pro is 88%.
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  Figure 24 shows the average accuracy of approximate opcode sequence with respect to 
IDA Pro for different file sizes in our test set. An average accuracy of 70.2% is achieved 
for all the files in our test set. 
Figure 24: Accuracy of Opcode Sequence
     As the file size increases, the accuracy decreases, but the drop in accuracy is not 
significant as the file size increases. This accuracy is good enough for detecting viruses 
using HMM.
These results prove that our approximate opcode sequence extraction algorithm is faster 
than IDA Pro for most cases and offers a significant speed up for larger files with a 
marginal loss of accuracy.
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7. Conclusion and Future works
     We implemented an approximate disassembly method that identified Most Frequently 
Occurred (MFO) instructions in the executable files and constructed three groups of 
opcode tables based on their operand sizes. We also collected the frequency of 
occurrence of opcode pairs from a set of files. An approximate opcode sequence is 
extracted from a given executable file, using the opcode tables and opcode pair statistics. 
Our method reduced the disassembly time by 45% as compared to the industry standard 
disassembler IDA Pro. It also achieved an accuracy of 70% as compared to IDA Pro. 
We collected opcode pair statistics to improve the extraction time. This concept 
can be extended to opcode triplets and, possibly longer opcode sequences, which might 
improve our accuracy. We currently use separate opcode tables for opcodes with zero and 
one operands. This can be extended to opcodes with two or three operands. This might 
reduce the extraction time and increase the accuracy of the extracted sequence.
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